Is Pakistan’s democracy a prisoner of geopolitics?
In this essay, I intend to highlight to what extent Pakistan’s geopolitics has played a role in the curbing of democratic norms and the compromising of democratic institutions. I argue the Pakistani military, through the narrative of ‘national interest’ and the characterization of external threats as ‘immediate’ and existential in scope, has successfully converged national and regional issues. The expressed lack of faith in civilian government by the military and the perceived internal and external threat of India, has led to a curtailing of democracy, where state-building and domestic policies are scrutinised through the lens of national security and survival.
One aspect that vividly illustrates Pakistan’s democracy being arrested by its own geopolitics, is its hostile relation with India. In Pakistan, military interventionism has been justified in perceived times of national crisis. Publicly, the military express their interventionism as a benign force, conjuring the narrative of ‘guided democracy’ under guardianship (A. Shah, 2014: 225). However, privately, the military often feels compelled to intervene in times of crisis and suspend parliamentarianism and civilian government in what they view as risks to national security. Elite circles within the military, whether in times of absolute power over the state or through coercion over civilian government, believe politicians do not have the acumen nor the nuanced understanding that political crisis is an opportunity for India to exacerbate internal and external issues (A. Shah, 2014: 204) – therefore internal weaknesses of Pakistan are often met with military responses.
To further understand why democracy is arrested in Pakistan due to the geopolitical tension with India, India has taken advantage of the political crisis and internal weaknesses in Pakistan for decades. The Pakistani military would point towards the Indian logistical and physical support of Bangladesh in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 (M. R Khetran, 2017: 122). A more contemporary example of this, is India funding insurgents in the politically and economically marginalized FATA regions, most specifically Balochistan which has minor separatist and nationalist aspirations (M. R Khetran, 2017: 116). Pakistan retaliates by funding insurgents in Kashmir and prepares itself extensively for asymmetric warfare, maintaining the ‘never again’ attitude of the embarrassment suffered in 1971 (A. Zakaria, 2019).
This geopolitical tension between Pakistan and India has direct negative trends for Pakistani democracy. Civilian government and parliamentarism is undermined when scarce resources reserved for national development are diverted to an already bloated military budget. The extensive arms race produces a disillusionment amongst the franchise, where the electoral promises they bought into do not transpire, such as vast extensions to the welfare state and infrastructure. The Pakistani military extracts a large chunk of the GDP appropriates public resources and makes nominal concessions to the annual budget before its disclosure to parliament for again ‘national security’ reasons’ (A. Shah, 2016: 42).
This evidence highlights that the immediate threat of India in the eyes of the Pakistani military means streamlining the wants of the people and therefore undermining democratic modes of representation is seen as a necessity for the survival of Pakistan as a whole.
Similar to India, Afghanistan’s geopolitical tension with Pakistan finds its roots in territorial disputes and nationalist aspirations, however, it is different in the sense it is not rooted in the civilisational or religious conflict of Hinduism and Islam, nor are Afghanistan as strong as India in the balance of power in the region. The way in which the contentious dynamic between Pakistan and Afghanistan has had adverse effects on Pakistani democracy, was in part due to the fear of encirclement on two fronts. Firstly, it was the fear of Soviet encroachment on Pakistani sovereignty during the Afghan-Soviet War and secondly the persistent nationalist claims and fear of a strong Pashtun government which could give rise to the claim of a separate homeland, Pashtunistan - a further dismemberment of Pakistan’s sovereign territory.
To counteract the fear of Soviet encroachment, the fundamentalist Islamisation of Pakistan domestically converged with the foreign policy over Afghanistan. A pattern continued in the representation of the military as a benign force under Zia-Ul Haq, and he represented his regime as a guardianship for a guided democracy. Although the method of Islamisation was extensive, it was mostly lip-service, and through the lens of political-economy, was used as a vehicle to protect the interests of the politico-business ruling elite, a tool to legitimise his government, and most importantly a way to extend their hand towards the lucrative Middle East and Gulf countries (C. H Kennedy, 1990: 73). The logistical and practically military-guided support for the Taliban in their fight against the Soviets transpired to the domestic sphere of Pakistan, where again potential internal weaknesses in Pakistan were responded to in military fashion. Democracy in Pakistan during this time was arrested through the weaponization of probable cause, which caused mass domestic surveillance carried out by the ISI and political repression by the Zia regime. The assumed collusion of Pakistani leftists and the Afghan-Soviet Marxist regime as a national security threat was enough probable cause to suspend civilian government and repress the main opposition, the Pakistan Peoples Party, and ultimately institutionalise Zia’s military regime (A. Shah, 2014: 158).
More recently, we can first assume that at face value the Taliban victory in Afghanistan is a victory in quelling territorial disputes of the previous Afghan government which was cynical of Pakistan (Paliwal, 2016: 193). Secondly, the exit of India from Afghanistan and the severing of the friendly relationship they had with the ousted Afghan government is also a relief for Pakistan in once again securing their largely undisputed Western border (The Economist, 2021). However, where we can deduce where democracy is under threat again by recent changes in geopolitics, is the threat of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which poses a major regional threat to the internal security of Pakistan. First, the Afghan Taliban victory has consequently energized terrorist groups, most specifically the TTP which plan their attacks from Afghanistan threaten to destabilize the Pakistani government (Noorzai & Yang, 2021). Secondly, terrorist and radical activity in the FATA regions is more likely to be galvanised (USIP, 2021). Imran Khan is not likely going to get in the way of the expanded legal and intrusive powers of the military or the ISI, considering the strings pulled by the military to get him into power (A. Siddiqa, 2019: 71). Although the military has a legitimate cause for concern and the likes of the TTP should be met with force, the FATA region is also a region that is vulnerable due to its economic and political marginalization, again it is a region that is scrutinised through the lens of national security.
Ultimately, the dynamic created an arrested system of democracy, as the rising security threats coming across the Durand Line, gave way to military assumed justification to continue their extrajudicial killings and abductions in the region. Ultimately, the legacy of marginalization and repression through Draconian law by the political bureaucracy and military in Pakistan has manifested into an internal security threat because of the ability of the TTP to tap into their grievances.
The Sino-Pakistan relationship has been characterised as having a remarkable resilience as mentioned within the literature, however, the historic relationship between Pakistan and China in the name of geopolitical security has arrested democracy in Pakistan, especially in recent years. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has exacerbated the dominance of the military in civil-military relations and as evidenced before and has consequently continued the legacy of the military’s questioning of the knowledge and capability of civilian-government, especially in the navigation of geopolitics.
Pakistan recognised Communist China in 1951, one of the first countries to do so when China was isolated on the international stage. China’s support for Pakistan (although limited in degree) in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as well as in the 1971 war and coupled with China’s border disputes with India most notably the Indo-China War of 1962, spelled out a long-lasting alliance between the two countries (Jan & Granger, 2016: 285). Pakistan since its independence has always realised China’s rise was inevitable and a warm relationship with them was imperative. This relationship culminated in decades worth of military aid and the securing of weapons-grade uranium to catalyse their nuclear weapon programme in 1976, Z. A Bhutto in his final days remarked the deal with Mao as his “greatest achievement” and his “contribution to the survival of our people and nation” (Z. A Bhutto, 1979: 225). Pakistan and its geostrategic positioning have proved pivotal for both the US and China in critical junctures in modern history. Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror was welcomed by the Pakistani politico-military elite, where masses of military and economic assistance within the billions again helped maintain Pakistan’s security just like it did during the Cold War and their strategic membership within SEATO (C. Jaffrelot, 2016: 4).
The question as to whether Pakistan’s democracy is being further arrested by China is explicit. Pakistan’s relationship with China and its overall healthy wider public perception in the past two decades has coincided with the demonisation and negative perception of the US, especially as the War on Terror dragged on. The US were characterised as intrusive, especially in their bombing of the FATA regions, whilst China was characterised as a non-interfering force (Jan and Granger, 2016: 290). However, the dynamics of the Sino-Pakistani relations have converged over the CPEC project, both in terms of security and economy, which spells out some major concerns. Dawn in 2017 exposed the ‘CPEC Master Plan’ which shows the depth of China’s intentions to effectively determine Pakistani sovereignty in security and democracy. China’s identification as Punjab as the dominant ethnicity, just like the Chinese preferential treatment of the Han Chinese sets a dangerous precedent (S. O Wolf, 2016: 2). The document only being provided towards the Punjab provincial government is indicative of the democratic backsliding of Pakistan, especially in the continuing of the exclusionary legacy of political representation of different tribes (Forbes, 2017: para 5). China’s identification of tribal diversity as a ‘problem’ in Pakistan, again exacerbates the weakening of democracy as it continues the identification of legitimate tribal grievances as national security threats. This violent repression is seen as a means to an end in the collective securitisation of Pakistan. The nature of the leak of this document also shows testament to the strength of parts of the Pakistani media in their defence of democracy – especially within the backdrop of the ISI’s Information Management Wing, which has been widely accused of blackmail and intimidation to manufacture public opinion (A. Shah, 2014: 228). The stringent outlining of security details highlight the main role the Pakistani military has undertaken in abiding towards Chinese diplomacy to secure the financial and infrastructure investment. Therefore, again through the vehicle of national security and the lens of geopolitics, the Pakistani military has arrested democracy during the CPEC project which would have been an excellent showcase for the capabilities of the civilian government. The implementation of CPEC and the security imperatives set by China, has then led to a unilateral mode of elite decision-making, in which the military has led logistical and political decisions in provincial areas (S. O Wolf, 2016: 23).
The evidence on the Sino-Pakistan relations has highlighted the decline of democracy through its concentration of power in the decision-making of the military, as well as the Pakistani military posing Pakistan as a client state to secure infrastructure development and military aid, instead of effectively utilising civilian-government to address economic and political grievances.
This essay has addressed three geopolitical factors which highlight the arrested development of democracy in Pakistan, in which I argued there has been a legacy of military undermining of civilian government and the scrutinization of domestic politics through the lens of geopolitics and national security. I have assessed Pakistan’s geopolitical dynamics with India, Afghanistan, and China, and all culminate in vividly painting the paranoia and suspicion of Pakistan. Although India was written as a single factor, it is clear they are seen as the fundamental threat to the survival of Pakistan. Pakistan’s geopolitical dynamics since their inception, whether that be from their shifting client support to the US or China or destabilising a Pashtun-dominated government, has always been to build up their military capacity and secure their borders from the perceived external and internal threat of India. Democracy has been curtailed and the military has justified this as a means to end towards the survival of their nation. If India is indeed the main recurrent threat, then it seems only the pacification and normalization of relations between Pakistan and India can save democracy in Pakistan.
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